The School Segregation Decision by James C. N. Paul by Anderson, C. Arnold
Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 45 | Issue 2 Article 22
1956
The School Segregation Decision by James C. N.
Paul
C. Arnold Anderson
University of Kentucky
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits
you.
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law
Journal by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation
Anderson, C. Arnold (1956) "The School Segregation Decision by James C. N. Paul," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 45 : Iss. 2 , Article 22.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol45/iss2/22
Book Review
The School Segregation Decision. By James C. N. Paul. The In-
stitute of Government, University of North Carolina, 1954, pp. x, 132.
A REVIEW
By C. ARNOrn ANDEIsoNz*
One cannot avoid being impressed by the statesmanlike discussion
of legal aspects of school desegregation in the recent monograph by
James C. N. Paul.'
Professor Paul would seem to have demonstrated that none of the
policies proposed in various states by which the force of the Supreme
Court decision might be evaded can withstand legal attack. Professor
Paul also reviews alternative proposals for carrying out the new policy
gradually in order to avoid traumatic upheavals in southern society.
This writer is not competent to evaluate the merits of the assertion that
there is adequate precedent for following the principle of gradualness
in effecting desegregation and thereby "give the State time to allay the
threat of serious disturbance which might disrupt the functioning of
the schools" (p. 79). Professor Paul gives us a clarifying analysis of
the arguments for and against the various means for allaying such
potential disturbance. Of particular interest to the present writer is
Professor Paul's hope (p. 87) that the Court may permit a State to
take 'limited but appropriate measures to prevent enforced mixed at-
tendance from resulting in such conditions as: a) Racial antipathies
seriously impairing the proper functioning of the schools, b) Serious
impairment of the academic standards of the schools, and c) Threats
to the health or psychological security of individual students who
might be affected by a change in schools."
One need be no profound observer of American society to point
out that these last three stipulations if taken too seriously would set up
a circular process that would indefinitely delay desegregation-and by
analogy prevent the adoption of any sweeping social reorganization.
In this note, however, the writer wishes to focus upon one main point:
many of the arguments for temporizing in desegregating are equivocal.
It is suggested that these temporizing pleas logically support a policy
of rapid desegregation for at least a portion of the pupils. Insofar,
Department of Sociology, University of Kentucky.
1 The School Segregation Decision, University of North Carolina Institute of
Government, 1954, Pp. x, 132.
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moreover, as these arguments for delay stem from non-legal sources
they are in large degree erroneous or inconsistent. Only one or two
of these two-edged arguments will be commented on here. It may be
pointed out also that the controversy that has raged about this problem
during the past two years reveals a clear disinclination to think co-
herently about the merits of the argument for gradualness. Professor
Paul's summary of the case for gradualness is so effective that many
readers will fail to perceive its ambiguity and will rely upon this plea
in order to produce what he calls "delay, dodges, and litigious con-
fusion" (p. 71).
In one section Professor Paul focuses upon the undeniable problem
of "taking account of differences in academic backgrounds between
Negro and White students" (pp. 81-2).2 "If local authorities could
demonstrate that pupils of one race in a given grade could not be ex-
pected to participate and keep up with students of the other race in
the same grade level, then it is arguable that immediate integration of
the two classes would be unreasonable and delay justifiable." (p. 81).
One need not explore the mental test archives in order to recognize
that in any school class in the nation a certain proportion of pupils are
seriously unable to 'keep up with' their fellow pupils. It is equally
certain that application of either intelligence or achievement tests
within southern schools would reveal that a by no means negligible
proportion of white students in any school system are unable to keep
up with a certain proportion of Negro students in the same school
system. If, then, we scrupulously apply this criterion of 'ability to keep
up with' as our guide to desegregation we must immediately put into
the same classrooms White and Negro students of equivalent ability
and separate the divergent levels of ability within each race.
Paul restates the 'ability argument for delayed desegregation (on
p. 111). "Thus, some schools might wish to conduct separate classes
for some or all Negro students where it becomes evident that these
students are insufficiently prepared, by way of training and academic
background, to participate in the white class."
To speak of "the white class" gives the argument away. White
children are not even approximately homogeneous, and there will
always be found some Negro students of at least median white ability.
Those who rely upon the 'ability' argument for gradualness of desegre-
gation should revise the above quotation (from p. 81) to conclude:
"then it is arguable that immediate integration of the equally able and
2 He fails to point out that Negroes may question the principles by which
Negro students who have been made inferior academically by previous southern
educational discrimination should now be asked to acquiesce indefinitely in further
segregation on the grounds of this very inferiority.
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equally skilled pupils from both races should be effected, the problem
of the less prepared Negro and white children being dealt with in due
time." And the first part of the same statement might read: "If some
of the pupils of each race in a given grade could not be expected to
participate and keep up with certain students of the same or of the
other race in the same grade level...".
A parallel argument on grounds of health is summarized (p. 82):
... the State should certainly be free to isolate or exclude from its
schools a child who is a carrier of contagious disease." The same
fallacy exists in this as in the previous argument. The appropriate
policy would be either exclusion of diseased pupils of both races or a
merging of the healthy of both races into one class and the diseased
of both races into another class. No disease is peculiar to either race.
Hence this argument, too, is in fact an argument for immediate de-
segregation and not an argument for continued segregation.
It is clear that those conscientiously supporting either of the fore-
going arguments are guilty of the same simple logical fallacy as that
used to justify moving all Japanese from the West Coast a few years
ago. Failure of otherwise intelligent men to perceive the clear implica-
tions of these arguments-immediate desegregation, not indefinite seg-
regation-suggests that the arguments are rationalizations.3
At a later point Professor Paul alludes to the possibility that a Negro
teacher might have difficulty "in establishing effective contact with
white students in many situations" (p. 114). What we know of the
traditional child-care customs in the South and of the emergence of
racial prejudices among children suggests that this worry may be quite
needless.
Professor Paul points out (p. 79) that a plea for gradual desegrega-
tion might be supported by requiring that "reference be made to
whether the community was predominantly rural or urban, to the com-
munity's history of racial relations, to the bona fide beliefs of responsi-
ble citizens, to the degree of social organization that pervades within
the community, to its economic background, and to other relevant
considerations demonstrating the likelihood of strife; and, above all,
reference should be made to the population factor, a consideration
which sociology and common sense indicate is of paramount im-
portance."
Amidst this plethora of factors, any community desiring not to
desegregate can find a good reason for its reluctance. One would be
more impressed by these arguments if one heard of communities using
3 There is no implication that Professor Paul believes these fallacies; his pub-
lication was presumably written as counsellor.
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them to justify prompt desegregation. On the other hand, one can
sympathize with a community that objects to being called upon to
undergo the trauma of desegregation (if it is going to be traumatic)
merely because it happens to have few Negroes or to have been more
statesmanlike in handling racial tensions in the past.
There is in fact some reason to doubt that the foregoing social con-
ditions are closely related to rigidity of racial attitudes.4 There is no
feasible way to determine the attitudes of a community toward de-
segregation except to carry out the policy and observe the results.
Already we have evidence that the attitudes of school officials toward
desegregation is a major factor affecting a community's reactions to
desegregation.
The argument of this note has been a simple one: the alleged
logical grounds for gradualness of desegregation are equivocal. The
same arguments support a policy of prompt desegregation and integra-
tion for at least a sizeable fraction of pupils.
COMMENT ON A REVIEW
By PRiomam D. GLLiAM, JR.*
This Journal welcomes the foregoing sociologist's review of a legal
article. The lawyer and the judge need the assistance of all the sci-
ences in solving all legal problems, and more especially, in solving
such complex problems as those involved in the School Segregation
Cases.1 Perhaps, however, a lawyer's comment on some of Professor
Anderson's points may not be inappropriate here.
In considering the adequacy of legal precedent for "establishing a
principle of gradualness" we should remember that the School Segre-
gation Cases are equity cases in which the plaintiffs are seeking the
extraordinary remedy of injunction. Persons whose legal rights are
violated have other sanctions available,2 and they are entitled to have
4 See the writer's "Inequality in Schooling in the South," American Journal of
Sociology, 1955, 60:547-61.
* College of Law, University of Kentucky1 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873
(1954); Boiling v. Sharp, 347 U.S. 497, 74 S.Ct. 693, 98 L.Ed. 884 (1954),
(hereinafter together referred to as the Brown decision); Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation, 349 U.S. 294, 75 S.Ct. 753, 99 L.Ed. 653 (1955), (hereinafter referred to
as the Brown decree).
2 These are, in these cases, the tort and criminal sanctions of the Civil Rights
Acts. 42 U.S.C. Sections 1981 to 1986, inc., (1952); 18 U.S.C. Sections 241-242
(1952). See Legal Sanctions to Enforce Desegregation in the Public Schools:
The Contempt Power and the Civil Rights Acts, 65 Yale L.J. 630 (1956). But
note that it is an open question whether the "right" recognized by the Brown
decision is "an immediate right to attend an integrated school," an immediate
